paid for by reducing the sums of money which are a tax on our resources which go into everyday prescriptions, perhaps that would be a price worth paying. At the same time, it seems, and this may seem eccentric, that perhaps there is still too much resistance to investigating non-drug oriented medicinewhat is sometimes called fringe medicine. Obviously the interest in acupuncture is something that brings that to mind. It may well be that the doctors of 50 years hence will look back to today and be somewhat surprised, perhaps as surprised as we are at some aspect of medicine 50 years ago, by the extent to which we leant on drugs.
In the immense complexity of modem medical science the need and right of the patient to assent to the treatment he is given seems often to be submerged. The formal consent he gives on entering hospital to the treatment he receives is, I understand, in many respects a formality which covers anything that is decided thereafter.
So far as new treatments are concerned and so far as the needs of the patient can be said to be an obstacle, there has to be a beginning to the application of every new thing. Where there is a doubt the needs of the patient should surely come first. One of the subjects that is at present being considered by the committee dealing with mentally abnormal offenders under Lord Butler's chairmanship is that of mentally abnormal patients who are also offenders who may receive treatment against their will, particularly where they are persuaded to accept it in the belief that it will lead to their discharge.
Obviously this applies particularly to treatments which may have bad long-term consequences, for example, certain drug treatments, but which patients may be persuaded to accept in the belief that it will mean that they will be let out. Obviously there is a special cause for concern with the detained abnormal offender as distinct from the hospitalized abnormal nonoffender since the former does not so easily have the protection of relatives. If I understand the position correctly, both in legal and ethical terms, the position of both is supposed to be the same, namely, he has to give his consent, but it is a pretty formal thing. The same is true of someone in hospital for a physical illness who may be in some danger of losing control over his own destiny. It seems that some kind of system which, as medicine becomes more complex, caters for this need is important. How far, for example, is it the practice to get an independent second opinion when patients and relatives wish for it, and perhaps even when they do not ask for it?
How far are the needs of individual patients on some occasions secondary to that of medical advance? How far is the comfort of the patient taken into account when there is a question of applying a new technique or treatment, the chances of success of which have not been measured? I cannot answer my questions as you can. Nevertheless, they are perhaps questions worth asking and thinking about. It is worth remembering that the word 'cure' derives from the word 'care'. This present phase of financial stringency could have its good side as well as its bad. The 'advance of medicine' postulates a continuing economic growth, or it has done. For the time being this will be slowed down. We can no longer hope to ride away with more and more cash for spending. This means that we shall have to consider far more frugally what we do with what we have got. In this climate only an open conversation with the medical profession and the public will enable the public to determine what its real needs are. One evening, just a year ago, my niece, who was then aged nine, asked her father: 'What is a lesbian?' My brother-in-law, who had read Dr Spock, coped with the situation with commendable cool. He settled his daughter in a comfortable chair and, eliminating emotional overtones, gave her a clear and honest answer to her question. She sat opposite him, nodding her head in understanding as he led her carefully through his explanation. When he had finished and he asked her once again if she understood, she nodded her head gravely in affirmation. Proud of his achievements, my brother-in-law, who happens to be a doctor, went to tell my sister of his triumph. Only then did he discover why the question had been asked. The child had been puzzled by the news that the people who had moved in next door were Wesleyans. I tell that story not as you might suspect in order to leaven what otherwise would be a pretty doughy contribution but because when my sister told it to me, she unlocked the thoughts I want to present to you today.
When I was invited to contribute to this symposium I thought I detected a questionable assumption in your letter, for you included public opinion in your list of 'forces which are checking and may seriously restrain further improvement in the practice of medicine.' The notion that medical practice could be regarded as a separate, almost sacred, entity undefiled by contact with the opinion of those upon whom it was practised stimulated me to write some hot-headed prose. But when I later looked at that prose with a cooler eye, and re-read your letter, I was not pleased with what I had written.
The only sentence worth preserving was the one in which I tried to answer your request that in dealing with public attitudes, I should 'try particularly to distinguish justifiable anxieties from uninformed fears.' The only distinction I could make then, and indeed the only distinction I can make now, is that uninformed fears are what patients suffer before their doctors tell them what they are going to do to them and justifiable anxieties are what they suffer after they have been told.
When my sister intervened with the story of my niece I realized that like my brother-in-law I had been led into a well-laid semantic trap. I had been led into assuming that public opinion actually exists; indeed not only exists but is capable of making demands. The only way to unsnare myself was to do some simple research. With the help of a market research company I constructed an 18-item questionnaire designed to elicit public attitudes towards medicine and medical research, and over the past five months I have elicited answers to the questions from a random sample of 100 people in London and 100 people in places as far apart as Wakefield, Ashford (Kent), Manchester, Leeds, and Walton-on-Thames. I shall not go into the details of this questionnaire because the sample is indeed small and up till now the answers to 17 of the questions have thrown up hopelessly confusing information. I thought however you might be interested in the answers to question No. 18 which was added only as an impish afterthought. It was this:
'You have just given me your opinion on a number of topics to do with medicine and medical research. Do you think your opinions:
(a) generally reflect public opinion on these matters, (b) differ from public opinion on these matters, or (c) you don't know.' And you may be as delighted as I was to discover that only 22% of respondents thought their ideas reflected public opinion, 70 % thought their opinion differed from public opinion, and 8 % didn't know.
I do not offer that as earth-shattering research. It is a simple thing, but my own. It does however raise a suspicion, if only in me, that public opinion is an elusive entity more often invoked than examined. The very phrase is a useful rhetorical prop: the mother phrase of others like 'the silent majority' or 'all right-thinking people'. Eloquence can make it even more impressive. When, for instance, a Bill that would grant a small degree of autonomy to the Church of Wales was debated in the Lords, the Earl of Birkenhead was moved to thunder: 'This is a Bill which has shocked the conscience of every Christian community in Europe.' Which being translated meant that it had upset Lord Birkenhead and a few of his cronies.
I am not much good at the invocation business so I would like to propose that what we are really discussing today is not public opinion but public mood and that that mood becomes an opinion only when a decision is demanded of itlike a vote or an answer to a pollster or an irresistible urge to back one side in a televised argument.
My image of the public mood is of a massive stewpot containing multifarious ingredients: Many of the ingredients are incompatible but the pot is large enough to contain them without danger of explosion; some are provided by the community's history, its religion and its climateboth economic and meteorological; others are thrown in by propagandists; yet others are fossils left by past persuaders. And on the top float new ideas, slowly diffusing into the stew.
And I suspect that in this country and at this time public mood has little effect on medical practice or research. Every attitude survey I have seen suggests that British people still put their trust in doctors and the first authority figures registered by children are doctors and teachers, their primacy challenged only by kings and queens or an occasional policeman.
Perhaps the only way the public mood can influence medical research at the moment is an indirect one affecting people's inclination to contribute to charities which fund research. I suspect, for instance, it would be easier to raise money for research into delinquency among dogs or horses than into delinquency among students at the University of Essex, just as I know it is easier to raise money and win friends to turn suburban villas into residential homes for spastic children than into half-way houses for rehabilitating drug addicts.
For the purpose of this symposium, however, the most important reason for recognizing we are dealing not with an opinion but with a mood is that a mood cannot make a demand, it can only produce a response. If activist groups wish to have any affect on medical research they must first evoke a public response. Some activist groups have tried and failed. I would not for instance regard the Patients' Association in this country as a particularly successful organization in terms of changing professional attitudes or behaviour. But in the United States some consumer groups have made a considerable impact on medicine, less on the conduct and application of research than on clinical practice, by giving patients information with which they can check the clinical performance of their doctors.
Suppose the public mood here were to change. Let us look at some of the people who can evoke responses from the public mood and even occasionally formulate those responses into the demands the chairman was so keen I should discuss.
The first obvious group is that which I have heard stout hearted BMA men call 'the mass communications news media', meaning television, newspapers, magazines and radio. The attempt to construct a comprehensive phrase, no matter how clumsy, implies that people who work on newspapers, magazines, television or radio form a homogeneous group with homogeneous needs which have to be met in a homogeneous way. The reality is that they are heterogeneous to a fault, struggling to survive in an entrepreneurial trade. Their only common denominator is that they all use words, though many of them also use pictures. The sort of information a reporter needs to record that an event has taken place is very different from that needed, say, by a feature writer trying to interpret a specialized happening for a non-specialist audience, or that sought by the investigative journalist who wants to sniff the air behind the platitudes. The idea that to be 'good with the Press' all you need to do is to project on to journalists what you think are their motives and their needs and then minister to those imagined needs has led to incidents of horrifying banality, like the 'I'm backing Britain' heart transplant. Doctors like many other people have an exaggerated idea of journalists' power to stir up public opinion. I suggest their power is limited probably to polarizing ideas already widely accepted. Journalists can provoke a response from people by giving them new information but I have never seen any evidence to suggest they can make their audience accept ideas it would prefer to reject. The late Lord Beaverbrook found to his cost that political ideas could not be foisted upon an unwilling readership even when the most skilled journalists of the day were brought together to mount a carefully planned campaign.
Other people who have a reputation for diagnosing the public mood and provoking it into producing an opinion are politicians. And as this conversion of mood to a vote is the foundation of their trade they are reasonably good at it. The drawback is that under our political system politicians win votes for all sorts of reasons unconnected with the public opinion they claim to represent. They offer us a package deal but we cannot tell them which contents of the package we like and which we would prefer to see returned to the manufacturer for further testing. Politicians are also, of course, generous contributors to the public stewpot because they are great producers of propaganda. But because their power depends more on them being able to capitalize on the public mood rather than to change it, their thinking tends to be dominated by the market research mentality. Like market researchers they are pretty good at measuring the status quo but are often discomfited because, after they have made their measurements, someone changes the game completely by throwing in a new idea or two.
Advertisers and advertising agencies form another group which can convert a person's mood into an opinion by demanding a decision of it. They are usually more successful when they offer a simple proposition like: 'X's beans are better than Y's because . . .' They are less successful with more complex propositions like that involved, for instance, in persuading people to stop smoking where even the most sophisticated advertising campaigns cannot match the effects of a personal approach and personal example.
The only people who would make strong claims to be moulders of public opinion are the public relations men who command large fees for doing just thatmaking the claims, I mean, not necessarily fulfilling them. I do not think they have as great an effect as they would like on public mood. Their main accomplishment is one they share with advertisers and journaliststheir ability to provide publicity for individuals and for events. People exposed to this publicity can then make their own judgments about the individuals and the events, and these judgments go into the stewpot with all the other ingredients.
The last group of people who, I think, do have an effect on public mood, and a greater effect than many people recognize, is a group which is difficult to describe in a simple slick phrase. There is abroad in our society a class of person which society, with the good sense for which it is renowned, often labels as rogues or troublemakers or, if it wants to be polite, as outsiders. These are the people whose abrasive quality can sometimes clog the smooth running of official machinery. They include quite a lot of writers and artists and some film directors, some journalists, some television producers, some teachers, even some doctors. Their socially useful role is that they are abrasive in the presence of power and questioning in the presence of received thought.
Their most dramatic achievements come only occasionally when they can point out to the conformists that the emperor has no clothes on. But they serve a useful day-to-day purpose by their very existence, for, if they are articulate, they can keep authority in a defensive position which I suggest is the only safe place for authority in a democratic society. And if they are particularly energetic they can occasionally subvert the natural order that Max Planck described, no doubt with tears in his eyes, the order that determines that new ideas gain wide acceptance only when established authorities die.
These peoplethe artists with their carefully cultivated positions of detachment described so well by James Joyce and Flaubert, and Liam Hudson's 'divergers' who actively resist conformityare I believe the most effective long term fashioners of the mood which politicians, advertisers, pollsters and propagandists can then convert into an opinion.
I apologize that I have in the end produced a negative response by suggesting that public opinion exists only at moments of decision, that these decisions rarely are demands, and that those which are demands rarely have anything to do with medicine.
There are however signs that as people grow more aware of things like the effect of limited resources on health care they may start to question some of our professional dogma and, if we do not make the right responses, people may accept medical authority less readily than they have in the past.
It is not really my role in this symposium to suggest how our profession should respond to such a change but I would be a coward if I were not to offer an opinion. My 12 years in clinical medicine and my 10 years as a writer have convinced me of the truth of one of life's thundering platitudesthat the quality people respond to most readily is honesty or, to be accurate, apparent honesty, which includes dishonesty before it is found out. They respect honesty of purpose and accept honest explanation. I am certain that if our profession wants to keep the public on its side it must accept the platitude and always be seen to behave openly and honestly.
Since I gave up being a doer of medicine and became a watcher I've grown more conscious of the way doctors live and work, often unknowingly, within a closed society. And the myth that dies hardest in that society is the myth that the ideal form of government is a benevolent dictatorship. I see this myth affecting the way we approach things like organizing our own hierarchical profession or the institutions within which we work and also in some of our attitudes towards patientsin the way for instance some doctors arrogate to themselves the right to distinguish between what they call patients' demands and patients' needs.
For those who seek proof that benevolent dictatorship far from being the ideal system actually obstructs achievement and the advance of knowledge, I suggest some dedicated reading of 'The Open Society and its Enemies' by Karl Popper, whom not even the Monday Club could describe as revolutionary. I find that Popper's arguments in favour of an open system appeal as much to my head as Churchill's exhortation 'When in doubt, put your trust in the people' appeals to my heart.
For the last word on the paternalistic approach, I consulted my niece whom I mentioned at the beginning of this paper. She remembered last year's incident very well. 'Of course, I knew Daddy had got it wrong,' she said. 'But I also knew if I interrupted him, he'd only get cross.' DISCUSSION Dr S Bradshaw (Hereford) pointed out that apart from the paper presented by Professor Williams there had been no definition of medical advance. It was commonly thought that over-population was the result of medical activity. Would the panel care to say whether they thought that that was a medical advance? The answer to over-population was looked for in medicine. If medicine provided the answer, would that too be regarded as a medical advance?
Professor Williams said that to the extent that the increase in the population was due to changes in medical practice and those things were desired by the community then it was undoubtedly a medical advance. The problems that had arisen subsequently were social, not medical. If people had doubts as to whether they were over-populated, those might be due to social reasons rather than to previous medical behaviour. If they accepted that there was an excess population and if people wanted to change that position and looked to medicine as a way of doing it and if medicine came up with an answer, then it would be a medical advance.
Mr Butt was not sure that it was relevant to relate medicine to over-population because it was only culpable if one said that medicine should not be involved in saving lives. If over-population was to any degree the consequence of medicine it presumably was because medicine had been successful in reducing mortality. That must be an advance because it contravened man's entire ethic to suppose that medicine should do anything else. He was not entirely certain whether world over-population existed. If it were thought that there was over-population it might be an advance ifmedicine could deal with it.
Dr O'Donnell said that he had the feeling that he was struggling in a semantic trap. A few months previously he had been in Jakarta where 47% of the male population was aged under 15. In that context one did not think in terms of who was a doctor and who was not. People were trying to tackle the problem using outside advisers who happened to be doctors. Experience had taught people who acted as outside advisers that the best they could hope to achieve as a medical outside adviser was to encourage people to make their own mistakes more quickly. Once a person arrived posing as the man who had the answer he was very quickly found out.
An unidentified speaker recalled that Professor Williams had said that the greatest resource constraint was not money but innovatory capacity. Dr O'Donnell had finished with a quotation from Max Planck about the greatest obstacle to medical progress or progress in any other field being the fact that new ideas were not accepted so readily. He wished to take issue with Professor Williams. The greatest obstacle to progress was not necessarily a lack of innovatory capacity but rather the gap between innovatory capacity and its findings being put into practice. Such a gap existed in our sophisticated society. It was possible that the existence of a fairly monolithic Health Service added to the difficulties of having new ideas accepted by the establishment. Perhaps a way of encouraging greater medical advance would be to assist independent research bodies such as those financed by charities and private concerns to a marginally greater extent than was done at present.
Professor Williams said that the way in which he had been using the term 'innovatory capacity' would not have allowed the speaker to draw such a distinction. He saw innovatory capacity as the business of putting things into practice. He presumed that the speaker was meaning that at some time there would be a fund of potential innovations waiting for effective application. He agreed that that was a problem but he was ascribing the gap to the lack of innovatory capacity.
Dr O'Donnell pointed out that Max Planck had been speaking on a personal level. He had said that new ideas gained wide acceptance only when established authorities died. Professor Peart had been speaking in the same sort of context when he had spoken of letting younger people come in and committing professional suicide.
An unidentified speaker asked whether Dr O'Donnell would agree that he had undersold public opinion. He did not believe that more than a tithe of doctors had thought that abortion was a good thing for patients ten years ago. Public opinion had so twisted the arm of medicine that abortion had been made very much safer. A new technique was involved. That was a classic example of public opinion forcing medicine to do something.
Dr O'Donnell pointed out that what he had said was that people who tried to reform would not have succeeded unless they had been able to mobilize public opinion and get the public to make a decision in their favour. Reforms did not occur spontaneously. If people wanted to produce reforms and could get the public behind them they were likely to succeed. Mr Butt did not think it was public opinion which had twisted the arm of the medical profession but an extremely capable pressure group which had twisted the arm of public opinion which in turn twisted the arm of the medical profession. Public opinion was very largely the creation of pressure groups. Newspapers responded to pressure groups all the time. On the whole newspapers tended to have a very stereotyped attitude towards any kind of event. In a sense that was an extraordinary limitation. The average reaction in any news room when an event occurred was to ring up some stock figure. If it was necessary to ring up a Roman Catholic then Norman St John Stevas was telephoned. Though he might be an admirable figure he was by no means the only Roman Catholic in the world. Similarly, if one wanted to speak to someone about education then one rang up Mr Brian Jackson or the Advisory Centre for Education. If it was abortion then one rang up the Abortion Law Reform Association.
There was no doubt that newspapers were inclined towards fashion. How a fashion was created was not entirely clear. The newspapers did not so much create as magnify while reflecting the views of the most active pressure groups. Public opinion then began to believe that that was the opinion it held. In that way a very few people could in a short time change what was acceptable to the public. If the public had been given full and proper time for discussion it would never have changed.
Professor Williams said that in relation to abortion it could be argued that it had been a put-up job by a pressure group. However, that argument would have been more convincing if the National Health Service had spent millions of pounds on building abortion clinics to which no one had gone. But a lot of people did go to such clinics and the pressure was for still more people to use them. Abortion was a good example of an issue involving strong moral and religious principles. The medical profession could and should point out to people the risks involved in abortion as well as the risks involved in not having an abortion. Having informed the public about such risks what right did the profession have to say 'No' or to insist upon people going ahead? There was a social decision to be made. Such issues would crop up over and over again when public opinion got the bit between its teeth. It was something with which the medical profession would have to live on an everincreasing scale.
Mr Butt said that it had been a put-up job in the sense that the consequences were not properly calculated. The question of the use of such a facility raised the whole issue of needs being created. If one believed in advertising in other senses, colour supplements and the like which created 'needs', if one believed that one could create in a patient the belief that he needed a pill, was it not also possible to create the so-called need for abortion?
Dr O'Donnell felt that the discussion reinforced his argument that perhaps abortion reform occurred because it evoked a response from the public. There had been other occasions when pressure groups had tried to evoke such a public response and failed. The Patients' Association had been referred to already. He instanced the attempt of The Times, assisted by Mr Bernard Levin, two years ago to turn Mr Taveme into a considerable political figure. Pressure groups could play on the public mood. To succeed he suggested that they had to be polarizing ideas which were already present.
An unidentified speaker suggested that the two non-medical speakers and the paper presented by Dr O'Donnell, who was not actively practising medicine, had politely been suggesting that one of the chief constraints on the advance in medicine today was the medical profession. He referred to what he spoke of as the three M'smanpower, measurement and mankind. There was restricted entry to medicine and underpayment to junior doctors, nurses and ancillary staff.
Treatments were applied without any real knowledge of their effects. How did the profession speak to patients and to the country at large? How did it impress what it saw as priorities upon the country? Was it not largely up to the medical profession to remove some of the self-imposed restraints?
Dr O'Donnell pointed to developments abroad. What had happened in China was beginning to make many people think. Striking a comparison between the socalled underdeveloped countries and the underdeveloping countries, he said that areas of rural deprivation in places such as Africa and South-East Asia would soon be matched by areas of urban deprivation in the United Kingdom. Possibly one way of coping with such areas of deprivation would be for the profession to drop some of its professional barriers and allow those who were not doctors to carry out medical duties in certain areas. That had happened already in the Third World.
